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. Introduction
Patent assertion entities. Patent monetizers. Patent trolls. Merely mentioning
them makes many shudder. By definition they exist only to extract revenue from
users of technology. They do so by first obtaining rights to enforce patents-the
right to sue for past damages and the right to seek prospective injunctive relief-and
then by threatening to enforce2 those rights on their technology-using targets. What
they seek are settlements in exchange for releases from liability for past infringe-
ment and licenses to practice their patented technology in the future or judgments
providing damages and injunctions. Their threat point is patent litigation, with all
of its headaches, expense, and risk.4 In short, if you are a user of technology (and
who isn't?) there is reason to shudder.
Some patent assertion entities employ engineers and scientists, apply for patents, and then, rather
than develop products using their patented technology, seek to license their patented technology.
Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the "Patent Troll" Rhetoric, 47
CoNN. L. REv. 435, 444-45 (2014) (noting that non-practicing entity (NPE) Intellectual Ventures
employs hundreds of inventors). Other patent assertion entities previously employed engineers
and scientists and applied for patents and only after failed attempts to commercialize their technol-
ogy sought to obtain some return on their previous investment in research and development
through a licensing model. Id, at 465 (noting that NTP, Inc. adopted a licensing business model
only after failed attempts to commercialize its patented wireless telecommunications technology).
Still, other patent assertion entities have never employed engineers and scientists but instead pur-
chase patents from ongoing or failed developers. Id. at 462 (highlighting Rockstar Consortium's
winning bid for the patent portfolio then owned by soon-to-be-bankrupt Nortel Networks). Addi-
tionally, some patent assertion entities use the licensing revenue on patents covering technology
they no longer practice to fund research and development of new technologies. Id. at 476 (describ-
ing Conversant's use of licensing revenue from its patents on DRAM microchips, which Conver-
sant no longer manufactures, to fund development of new flash memory technologies).
2 Enforcement occurs through both out-of-court licensing negotiations and through in-court patent
litigation.
Patent assertion entities seek injunctions to increase their bargaining power in an effort to obtain
greater settlements, not to prohibit competition vis-A-vis their own use of the patented technology.
Patent assertion entities are NPEs; by definition, they do not practice their patented technology.
Not all NPEs, however, are patent assertion entities. Universities, for example, are NPEs, but they
do not exist only to extract revenue from users of technology through enforcement of their patents;
universities seek to educate students, collect tuition, obtain private and government grants, explore
the outer limits of engineering and science, and expand their influence and reputations.
4 See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM, L.
REV. 2117, 2126 (2013) (noting that some NPEs rely on the high cost of patent litigation to bring
about nuisance-value settlements).
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While the existence of patent assertion entities is not new,' in recent years they
have proliferated,6 spawning debate concerning their impact on the patent system
and, more broadly, on technological innovation. In the last two years alone there
has been a robust debate among law professors about whether patent assertion enti-
ties help or hinder innovation, about the best empirical methods to study patent as-
sertion entities to identify their impact on innovation and the conclusions to be
drawn from these empirical studies, and about appropriate reforms to address per-
ceived problems associated with patent assertion entities.
Despite the fear that they instill in their targets-or perhaps because of it-
patent assertion entities arguably serve a beneficial purpose in the patent system.
As specialists in the field of patent enforcement, theoretically they should be able to
help individual inventors and small businesses obtain a return on their investment in
research and development. Developers of technology who have obtained patents
but lack experience in the complex field of patent licensing and litigation, or per-
haps the financial wherewithal to engage in the costly endeavor of patent litigation,
might be unable (or at least less likely) to force infringers to pay for their infringe-
ment.9 And one of the central features of the patent system is to reward inventors
s See, e.g., Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Patent Alchemy: The Market for Technology in US History,
87 Bus. HisT, REv. 3, 36 (2013) ("Opportunism in the market for technology gets much more me-
dia attention nowadays than it did in the nineteenth century. However, it is not clear that the 'troll'
problem is commensurately more serious than it was in the earlier period.") (citation omitted).
I See David S. Olson, On NPEs, Holdups, and Underlying Faults in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. ONLINE 140, 140 (2014) (noting the "very rapid growth in NPE patent assertion in recent
years').
7 See generally James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REv. 387 (2014); Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TEcH. L. REV.
461 (2014); Robin Feldmann & W. Nicholson Price II, Patent Trolling: Why Bio & Pharmaceuti-
cals Are at Risk, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 773 (2014); Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4; Brian J.
Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate
Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 1309 (2013); David S. Olson, On NPEs,
Holdups, and Underlying Faults in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REv. ONLNE 140 (2014);
Osenga, supra note 1; Hannibal Travis, Patent Alienability and Its Discontents, 17 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 109 (2014); David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-
Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425 (2014).
See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 7, at 409 (acknowledging that small to mid-sized patent
owners may gain value from patents because of NPEs); Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 7, at 428
(recognizing the argument that NPEs may assist small to mid-sized patent owners in obtaining val-
ue from patents); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
AssEssING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE
PATENT QuALITY 35 (2013) ("[I]nventors who do not have the resources or skills to enforce patents
on their own benefit from partnering with [patent monetization entities] that specialize in patent
monetization . . .")
9 See James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 210 (2006) ("This relatively
high cost has the effect of inhibiting the abilities of individual inventors and small entities to en-
force their patents against large corporations.").
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monetarily for their inventions.' The prospect of this reward encourages future in-
ventors to invest in research and development and to file patent applications disclos-
ing their inventions for the world to understand and improve." In short, to the ex-
tent patent assertion entities assert patent claims that are truly valid, infringed, and
enforceable;1 2 obtain reasonable settlements and judgments reflecting the value of
use of their patented technology;" and return a substantial portion of their settle-
ments and judgments to inventors,1 4 the patent system is working, as it is designed,
to reward invention and disclosure.
But the reality is that patent assertion entities are seen as a plague on the patent
system. As with used car salesmen, few like them. They are viewed as "sharks,"
"trolls,"' 6 "orcs,"7 "middlemen,"18 "pirates,"" and "dealers." 20  In short, they are
seen as undeserving of the money that they obtain; the money that they obtain, ac-
cording to critics, should either stay in the hands of technology users or be given to
the inventors of the technology.2' Indeed, according to a recent critique by two law
10 See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 7, at 439 (identifying "rewarding inventors" as a policy interest
of the patent system).
" See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4, at 2121 ("The patent system is designed to encourage inno-
vation by giving inventors the exclusive right to their technologies for a limited period of time.").
12 See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 7, at 455 (arguing that the larger issue surrounding NPEs re-
quires looking "beyond the identity of the patentee" to whether the asserted patents are valid, en-
forceable, and infringed, or whether the defendants are "merely easy targets for a nuisance law-
suit").
3 See David 0, Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV.
79, 88-89 (2014) (arguing that reasonable royalties should reflect the value of use of patented
technology rather than the value of exploitation of patent rights).
14 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 7, at 411 (arguing that payments to inventors constitute only
about 20 percent of defendants' direct "costs," where these "costs" include settlements and judg-
ments plus legal expenses defending patent lawsuits).
15 See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils ofinno-
vation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1809, 1809 (2007) (quoting Senator Isaac Christiancy's speech
during congressional debates in 1878).
1 See, e.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4, at 2118 (discussing use of the term "troll").
17 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)
(No. 05-130) ("[M]aybe we should think of it more as Or[c]s, now that we have a new generation,
but at this point troll is the word that gets . .. used.").
"8 See, e.g, Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 7, at 430 ("Some argue that NPEs are bad on the ground
that they function as middleman between the original inventor and the infringer.").
9 See M. Craig Tyler, Patent Pirates Search for Texas Treasure, TEXAs LAWYER, Sept. 20, 2004,
available at https://www.wsgr.com/news/PDFs/09202004 patentpirates.pdf ("A growing breed of
patent litigators is sailing the seas of Texas federal courts. Sometimes called patent pirates, they're
in search of easy money, and they're coming to a courtroom near you.").
20 See, e.g, McDonough, supra note 9, at 200 (proposing that patent trolls be called "patent dealers").
21 See generally Bessen & Meurer, supra note 7, at 397 (criticizing patent assertion entities as exact-
ing a $29 billion tax on innovation in 2011). Any failure of patent assertion entities to return sub-
stantial value to inventors may at least in part reflect any of various market defects. One potential
defect is a lack of competition in the market for patent assertion. To the extent patent assertion en-
tities have to compete with each other, they have to return more value to patent owners from which
they acquire the rights to enforce patents. Other market defects, including imperfect information
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professors, patent trolls levied "a $29 billion tax on innovation" in 2011.22 Despite
concerns with this number-including the fact that it includes the very payments
from infringers to patent owners that the patent system seeks to force 2 -the "$29
billion tax" criticism of patent assertion entities has gone viral, as shown by refer-
ences to it in Congressional hearings, judicial briefs, academic legal discourse, and
even the popular press.24
Patent assertion entities, however, in and of themselves are not the problem.25
To the extent they assert patent claims that should be held invalid, not infringed, or
unenforceable; obtain unreasonable judgments or settlements; or fail to return a sub-
stantial portion of these settlements and judgments to inventors, patent assertion en-
tities primarily highlight underlying problems with the patent system.26 And there
are three primary problems with the patent system that some patent assertion enti-
ties exploit: poor patent quality, problems with patent litigation, and various asym-
metries in the patent system.27 When there is criticism generally of patent assertion
entities, the root of these criticisms usually is at least one of these three primary
problems.28
held by patent owners regarding the value of their patents and how to engage in licensing and liti-
gation, may also contribute to any failure of the market to return substantial value to inventors.
22 Id. at416.
23 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 7, at 439 n.72.
24 See, e.g., Demand Letters and Consumer Protection: Examining Deceptive Practices by Patent
Assertion Entities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, and Ins. of the
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 113th Cong. 25-26 (2013) (statement of Julie P. Samuels,
Senior Staff Attorney, Mark Cuban Chair to Eliminate Stupid Patents, Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion); Innovation Act: Hearing on HR. 3309 Before the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong.
160, 246, 272 (2013) (referencing the $29 billion figure multiple times, including its use in a joint
letter to the committee leaders from large corporations such as Amazon, Facebook, and Googic);
The Impact of Patent Assertion Entities on Innovation and the Economy: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 2
(2013) (opening statement of the Hon. Tim Murphy, A Representative in Congress from the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania); Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 26, Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) (No. 13-854), 2014 WL
4101231; Brief of Amici Curiae Law, Business, and Economics Scholars in Support of Respond-
ents at 17, Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (No. 13-298), 2014 WL
880952; Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: A
Competition Curefor A Litigation Disease?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 501, 513 (2014); Elise Ackerman,
The $29 Billion Tax on Innovation, FoRBES (Sept. 12, 2012, 9:58 AM),
http://www.forbes.coT/sites/eliseackerman/2012/09/12/the-29-billion-tax-on-innovation/.
25 See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4, at 2120 ("[T]hc focus on patent trolls obscures a more
complex set of challenges confronting the patent system.").
26 See id at 2121 ("Patent trolls alone are not the problem; they are a symptom of larger problems
with the patent system.").
27 See infra Part 11.
1 As an example, take President Obama's assertion that patent trolls are "just trying to essentially
leverage and hijack somebody else's idea and see if they can extort some money out of them."
Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American Innovation, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG
(June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patent-trolls-proteet-
american-innovation. If a patent owner is leveraging "someone else's idea," then the patent pre-
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This article analyzes the current state of affairs regarding patent reform legisla-
tion-some enacted, some not-and the extent to which it addresses the primary
problems with the patent system that some patent assertion entities exploit. Part II
begins by identifying these primary problems: poor patent quality, problems with
patent litigation, and various asymmetries in the patent system. Part III then ana-
lyzes the extent to which legislation addresses these three problems. Part IV finally
considers whether legislative reform rather than judicial or agency reform is the best
avenue to address these problems.
I. Problems with the Patent System that Some Patent Assertion Entities
Exploit
Law professors seem to be converging around the idea that patent assertion en-
tities, in and of themselves, are not really the problem, but that there are existing
problems with the patent system that some patent assertion entities exploit." In my
view, the primary problems some patent assertion entities exploit can be put into
three categories: (1) poor patent quality, (2) problems with patent litigation, and (3)
various asymmetries." In this Part, I identify and expound upon these problems.
A. Poor Patent Quality
The first problem with the patent system that some patent assertion entities ex-
ploit is poor patent quality. One way to think of poor patent quality is the idea that
too many patents do not satisfy the existing standards of patentability. There is da-
ta, for example, supporting the idea that the patents asserted by patent assertion enti-
ties are more likely to be found invalid in court." According to this critique, how-
ever, neither the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) nor the courts correctly apply
sumably is invalid because it claims what is in the prior art. If the idea is not in the prior art, then
the patent owner has the right to exclude its use during the term of the patent. In that sense, at
least, it is the patent owner's idea. Thus, President Obama's criticism may relate to patent quality
but not on the form of the entity asserting patent rights, or whether it engages in any activity other
than asserting patent rights. In the alternative, his criticism may relate to concern for those who do
not copy the original inventor's idea but instead independently develop the same technology later.
See generally Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L.
REv. 1421 (2009) (analyzing the law governing copying and presenting results of a study indicat-
ing few patent infringement cases involve copying). If this alternative explanation is co'rrect, the
concern relates to information asymmetry. In this article, I address both patent quality and infor-
mation asymmetry. See infra Parts lI.A & II.C.1.
29 See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4, at 2180 ("Rather than focusing on the trolls-the symp-
toms-the law should turn its attention to the disease itself."); Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 7, at
456 ("[W]e should not focus on the identity of the patent holder; instead, we should examine the
actions of the patent holder and the merits of their patent assertions."); Hannibal Travis, Patent Al-
lenability and Its Discontents, 17 TJL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 109, 128 (2014) ("Some of the
claims that NPEs and PAEs will destroy competition and innovation appear to be unfounded.").
so While most criticisms of patent assertion entities relate to their exploitation of these primary prob-
lems, some practicing entities also exploit these problems; these problems are not necessarily
unique to patent assertion entities.
See Lenley & Melamed, supra note 4, at 2189 (stating that trolls' patents are more likely to be in-
validated on prior art grounds).
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the existing standards governing eligibility, novelty, non-obviousness, and the ena-
blement, written description, and definiteness requirements. Thus, pursuant to this
view both the PTO and the courts too often incorrectly allow patents to issue and
remain in force. If this is the problem, of course, then better enforcement of exist-
ing standards is the appropriate response. More resources, for example, should be
given to the PTO and to courts to enforce existing standards. The PTO should hire
better examiners and administrative judges, provide more and better training, allow
examiners and administrative judges to spend more time reviewing applications,
and provide better procedures to invalidate issued patents. Courts should be given
extra funds to hire law clerks to work on patent cases. This critique would also
seemingly support increased specialization and expertise of specialized courts.
Another way to think of poor patent quality is the idea that the existing stand-
ards of patentability are too lax. According to this second critique, the standards
themselves need to change to eliminate more patents. More inventions, for exam-
ple, should fall within the judicial exceptions for patentability; a claim should iden-
tify a greater difference with the prior art to satisfy the non-obviousness require-
ment; the specification should be required to include more detail to satisfy the
enablement and written description requirements; and a claim should be required to
include more detail to satisfy the definiteness requirement. This critique supports
aggressive modifications to substantive patentability standards by the President and
Congress as well as courts with control over the interpretation of these standards-
the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court. Related to this critique is the idea that
there are too many patents such that there is a patent thicket,34 Instead of numerous
patents each claiming incremental improvements, say the critics, the patent system
would do better with fewer patents claiming blockbuster advances."
B. Problems with Patent Litigation
The second problem is really a collection of problems with patent litigation:
uncertainty, a lack of effective disincentives to poor quality patent assertions, exces-
sive cost, and problems with remedies.
32 But see Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1497
(2001) ("Because so few patents are ever asserted against a competitor, it is much cheaper for so-
ciety to make detailed validity determinations in those few cases than to invest additional resources
examining patents that will never be heard from again.").
3 See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 75 (1989) (discussing the merits and limits of specialized courts using the
creation of the Federal Circuit as an example).
3 McDonough, supra note 9, at 203 ("In the patent thickets, a technology is prone to underuse be-
cause of the high costs of licensing resulting from multiple ownership stakes in the same technolo-
gy.").
3 See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biotnedi-
cine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 289, 290 (2003) (describing the Federal Circuit's approach to
patent law as favoring incremental improvements).
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1. Uncertainty
According to Federal Circuit Judge Jay Plager, there is an "endemic problem
of uncertainty in law and the judicial decisional process, and particularly in patent
law."" Uncertainty exists in patent law, in particular, because of the difficulty in
drafting clear claims and in predicting how courts will interpret these patent claims
to define the scope of the right to exclude; these uncertainties infect the invalidity
and infringement analyses." But the level of uncertainty in patent law is high based
in part on the Supreme Court's repeated rejection of bright line rules adopted by the
Federal Circuit to govern various substantive doctrines, including eligibility, non-
obviousness, definiteness, the doctrine of equivalents, and injunctive relief .
Moreover, a recent, contributing factor to the current level of uncertainty in patent
law is the numerous doctrinal changes to the patent system given recent legislation"
and Supreme Court cases.4 0 This uncertainty raises costs for patent litigants. Some
patent assertion entities may take advantage of this uncertainty and cost by targeting
potential infringers that are particularly risk averse, including small businesses.41
2. Lack of Effective Disincentives to Poor Quality Patent Assertions
Another problem with patent litigation has been the lack of appropriate disin-
centives to address poor quality patent assertions. Poor quality patent assertions in-
cludes the assertion of poor quality patents-patents that are likely invalid-but al-
so the assertion of patent claims that, even if valid, are likely not infringed. The
lack of clarity in patent claims and their correct interpretation leads to poor patent
assertions,42 but so has the lack of an effective incentive for patent owners not to
adopt a very broad interpretation of a claim in an effort to prove infringement. For
example, while broad interpretations increase the risk of invalidation based on the
novelty, non-obviousness, enablement and written description requirements, these
3 S. Jay Plager, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: On Uncertainty and Policy Levers, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 749, 749 (2010).
" See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA.
L. REV. 335, 349 (2012) ("[T]here is a high degree of uncertainty in how the patent claims will be
interpreted."). The difficulty of drafting claims likely correlates to the complexity of the underly-
ing technologies.
* David 0. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and Standards,
46 CONN. L. REv, 415, 440 (2013) (discussing the Supreme Court's tendency to replace "the Fed-
eral Circuit's bright-line rules with more open-ended standards").
* See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
0 See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A Prescription for Appellate Re-
view of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REv. 657, 657 (2009) ("[Iln recent years, the Su-
preme Court has spoken repeatedly and forcefully on questions of substantive patent law.").
41 See Chien, supra note 7, at 465.
42 See Schwartz, supra note 37, at 349-50 (noting the uncertainty of claim construction). This lack
of clarity, to the extent it correlates to the underlying technologies, may explain why certain tech-
nologies experience poor patent assertions more oflen than other technologies.
320 [Vol, 23:313
Legislative Responses to Patent Assertion Entities
defenses must be proven by clear and convincing evidence in litigation. 4 3 Moreo-
ver, until recently, the Federal Circuit required a district court to find both subjec-
tive bad faith and objective reasonableness before finding a case exceptional and
awarding fees to the prevailing party in a patent infringement case.44 And only in
rare cases have courts sanctioned attorneys for bringing frivolous patent infringe-
ment claims. 5 Finally, while risk of fee shifting, sanctions, and reputational con-
cerns might guide the conduct of some patent owners, these concerns matter less
when the patent owner is a patent assertion entity created for the sole purpose of
owning and enforcing a particular patent or set of patents, it does not have substan-
tial cash or other assets, and its relationship to particular individuals or other com-
panies is opaque. In this situation, the patent assertion entity may be able to avoid
any blowback from a patent assertion, let alone a poor quality assertion.
3. Excessive Cost
Another problem with the patent system is the excessive cost of patent litiga-
tion.4 6 In effect, this high cost allows for excessive rent seeking by patent owners.
Critics cite various causes of the excessive cost.47 The technical nature of the litiga-
tion, including its need for expert testimony on issues of invalidity and infringement
and attorneys with expertise in both law and technology, no doubt contributes to the
expense and may be unavoidable. Procedural complexity, including the use of sep-
arate claim construction hearings, no doubt also contributes to the expense. One
cause of the movement among district courts to adopt fairly complex local patent
3 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (holding that defenses to patent
infringement claims must be proved by clear and convincing evidence); but see generally David 0.
Taylor, Clear but Unconvincing: The Federal Circuit's Invalidity Standard, 21 FORDIlAM IP,
MEDIA, AND ENT. L.J. 293 (2011) (criticizing this standard).
4 Brooks Fumiture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting
that in the absence of misconduct, "exceptional" cases exist only when subjective bad faith and ob-
jective reasonableness exist), abrogated by Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's strict rule in favor of re-
quirement that a case be "uncommon,' "rare," or "not ordinary" with respect to either the strength
of the parties' litigating position or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated. Oc-
tane Fitness, 134 S.Ct. at 1756. This holding created an incentive for a patent owner not to adopt
an unreasonably broad interpretation of a claim, at least to the extent the patent owner is not judg-
ment proof
45 See, e.g., View Eng'g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
4 Any allegation of excess must identify a point of comparison. In this regard, consider that an em-
pirical study has shown that relative to other litigation, intellectual property litigation is significant-
ly more expensive. See EMERY G. LEE Ill & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
LITIGATION COSTS IN CiVt CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 8 (2010) ("In terms of nature-of-suit
categories, Intellectual Property cases had costs almost 62% higher, all else equal, than the base-
line 'Other' category."). And, while not comparative, consider a survey of patent litigation practi-
tioners showing that in 2013, even for relatively low-risk patent lawsuits, parties incurred a median
total cost of $700,000 in all lawsuits with less than $1 million at risk and a median total cost of
$600,000 in lawsuits brought by NPEs with less than $1 million at risk. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP.
LAW Ass'N, 2013 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 34-35 (2013).
47 See, e.g., Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 7, at 448 (noting the high cost of discovery in litigation).
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rules is to reduce cost associated with disputes over the appropriate procedure for
disclosing infringement and invalidity contentions, claim construction positions,
and expert reports, but perhaps these procedures are too complex and compliance is
too costly." Another cause of expense is the complexity of substantive patent law.
Consider, for example, that prosecution history estoppel is the exception to the ex-
ception to non-infringement, and yet it has its own exceptions." As another exam-
ple, consider that there are no less than fifteen factors relevant to determining a rea-
sonable royalty, and they are still non-exclusive.50  A third example is the
complexity of the analysis of so-called means-plus-function limitations.5 ' The
complexity of these substantive patent law doctrines and others also contributes to
the need for more expensive work by attorneys, technical experts, and damages ex-
perts. Critics also cite excessive discovery costs, including costs associated with
electronic discovery, in patent litigation." As a result of these costs, critics seek re-
ductions in the cost of patent litigation or low cost alternatives to litigation.
4. Problems with Remedies
Other problems with patent litigation include problems with its remedies. The
law currently, for example, does not ensure that reasonable royalties-the main
remedy patent assertion entities seek-reflect only the value of the patented tech-
nology rather than the value of the ability to impose risk of liability, negotiation
costs, and litigation costs on accused infringers." Likewise, it is seen as problemat-
ic if courts grant patent owners injunctions that prohibit the use of entire devices
48 N.D. ILL. LPR Preamble (stating in the Preamble of the Local Patent Rules that the rules are in-
tended to "provide a standard structure for patent cases that will permit greater predictability and
planning for the Court and the litigants" by "eliminate[ing] the need for litigants and judges to ad-
dress separately in each case procedural issues that tend to recur in the vast majority of patent cas-
es"); Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 46 Az. ST. L.J. (forthcoming
2015) (discussing the reasons for the creation of the first local patent rules in the Northern District
of California as reducing cost and delay and describing the Eastern District of Texas local patent
rules as requiring defendants to "conduct extensive discovery quickly and expensively or settle the
case")-
4 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002) (explaining
that "[t]here are some cases, however, where the amendment cannot reasonably be viewed as sur-
rendering a particular equivalent," an explanation which introduces exceptions to prosecution his-
tory estoppel, which is an exception to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, which is an
exception to non-infringement under the requirement of literal infringement).
5 See Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (SD.N.Y. 1970), modi-
fled sub. nom. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.
1971).
5' See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2181 (9th ed. Mar.
2014) (providing guidance for USPTO patent examiners evaluating a means-plus-function claim).
52 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 7, at 402 ("[E]scalation in patent-litigation costs . .. [is due to]
the growth in electronic discovery in the past decade").
5 Taylor, supra note 13, at 116 ("[V]aluation of patented technology does not include any discounts
associated with the risk of liability, relief, or enforcement. Nor does it include any discounts asso-
ciated with disproportionate costs of patent litigation.").
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when only particular components of those devices infringe. 5 4 In both ways, the pa-
tent system may be giving patent owners too much of a reward for the infringement
of their patents." And given that patent licensing occurs in view of the remedies
that a patent owner receives or can expect to receive in patent litigation, these prob-
lems may infect licensing agreements.5 6 Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have made
the case, not without dispute, that this is so-that hold up and royalty stacking have
inflated both negotiated and court-awarded royalties."
C, Various Asymmetries
The third problem is really a group of problems related to the patent system's
asymmetries: information asymmetry, cost asymmetry, and risk asymmetry.
1. Information Asymmetry
There are two goals commonly associated with the patent system: to encour-
age invention and to disseminate information regarding inventions." The patent
system is not, at least directly, meeting its goal of disseminating information regard-
ing inventions if engineers and scientists purposely avoid reading patents.9 Yet
4 See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (expressing ap-
proval of the district court's concern that "entire products would be enjoined based on 'limited
non-core features"'); eBay Inc. v. MereExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ("When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the compa-
nies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in ne-
gotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunc-
tion may not serve the public interest.").
See id.
6 Mark A, Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1991,
1993, 2021-22 (2007); eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[A]n injunction, and the
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to
charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.").
Id.; but see Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Exces-
sive Royalties?, 4 J. COMP. L. & EcoN. 535, 535-36 (2008) ("[C]urrent patent remedies often (ar-
guably usually) result in royalty rates that are too low to sufficiently reward socially optimal inven-
tion."); John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" andPatent Remedies, 85 TEx. L.REv.2111, 2161 (2007)
(arguing that Lemley and Shapiro failed to prove that patent holders are actually overcompen-
sated).
5 Craig Allen Nard, TiH LAW OF PATENTs 3 (3d ed. 2013) ("[P]atent law can be viewed as an incen-
tive-based system of laws that offers a potential financial reward as an inducement to invent, to
disclose technical information, to invest capital in the innovation process, and to facilitate efficient
use and manufacturing of invention through licensing."); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 648-53
(2010) (recognizing the goals of encouraging innovation and disseminating information about in-
ventions).
I say directly because if it is true that the filing of a patent application frees inventors to make other
public disclosures about their inventions-and those inventors would not otherwise make those
public disclosures-then in an indirect way the patent system is reaching the goal of dissemination
of information regarding inventions. See Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1, 21-34 (2012) (describing examples of ways inventors may disclose their technology only
after filing a patent application).
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that is what some engineers and scientists reportedly do." The problem that the pa-
tent system has not solved is how to disseminate effectively information regarding
inventions-and the fact that they are patented-from inventors to potential users;
this is information asymmetry. Certainly the purpose of the enablement and written
description requirements is to increase the quality of the disclosure.' Furthermore,
the marking requirement encourages constructive notice of at least some types of
patents (system but not method patents) with respect to at least some patent owners
(those who practice patented technologies or license others to do so).2 But these
requirements do not provide a mechanism of dissemination. In terms of the existing
mechanism, the PTO now as a default rule publishes patent applications eighteen
months after filing in addition to publishing patents when they issue, and it provides
search capabilities in person at the PTO and on the PTO's website." Furthermore,
the PTO maintains a searchable database of assignment records.'
Beyond this, the PTO has provided its core databases to Google, and Google
has created its own web interface and its own searching capabilities. 5 Neverthe-
less, it is a continuing concern that information regarding inventions fails to reach
other potential inventors and users of technology; this failure results in unnecessary
and inefficient redundant invention,6 6 as well as so-called inadvertent infringement
and litigation rather than licensing." The former, redundant invention, is caused by
ex ante information asymmetry: the failure of information exchange and the result-
6o See Lisa Larrimore Oucllette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARv. LL. & TECH.
545, 572-74 (2012) (discussing various reasons why researchers choose not to read patents).
1 See Rantanen, supra note 59, at 6 ("[U]nderlying conventional disclosure theory is the idea that
patent law promotes information dissemination by forcing inventors to reveal the technological
underpinnings of their inventions, a function it achieves through the requirements of enablement,
written description, and best mode.").
2 See Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The purpose
of the constructive notice provision is to give patentees the proper incentive to mark their products
and thus place the world on notice of the existence of the patent.") (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
6 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2013) ("[E]ach application for a patent shall be published, in accordance with
procedures determined by the Director, promptly after the expiration of a period of 18 months from
the earliest filing date for which a benefit is sought under this title."); see also Search for Patents,
USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/search-patents (last modified
Feb. 3, 2015) (providing access to searchable databases along with search guidance).
6 Assignment Search, USPTO.GOV, http://assignment-uspto.gov (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (provid-
ing all recorded assignment information since August 1980). Notably, the underlying law does not
require the owners of patent rights to record their rights, even though it provides incentives to
those that do. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2013) ("An interest that constitutes an assignment, grant or
conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consid-
eration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office. . . .").
65 About Google Patents, GOOOLE, https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/2539193?hlkcn (last vis-
ited Feb. 1, 2015).
66 See John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEx. L, REv. 505, 531 (2010) (describing
patent racing).
6 See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1421,
1462-65 (2009).
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ing imbalance of information between original inventors and later inventors and us-
ers before re-invention or use of the patented technology begins. The latter, inad-
vertent infringement and litigation, rather than licensing, is caused by ex post in-
formation asymmetry: the failure of information exchange and the resulting
imbalance of information between original inventors and later inventors and users
even after re-invention or use of the patented technology begins."
2. Cost Asymmetry
Patent litigation is, generally speaking, more expensive for accused infringers
than patent owners. In terms of who bears the costs, typically accused infringers
themselves bear the cost of paying attorneys to represent them by the hour, while
patent owners may be able to avoid bearing the upfront cost of attorney's fees using
contingent fee arrangements.6 9 In terms of the costs of discovery, accused infring-
ers must always collect documents from engineers, scientists, and business repre-
sentatives associated with the accused product or service, and this collection may be
substantial depending on the number of document custodians. By contrast, while
patent owners must always collect relevant documents from inventors and repre-
sentatives that sought to license or enforce the patents, they probably need to cotlect
documents from engineers, scientists, and business representatives only if they are
arguably practicing their own patented technology. Thus, the cost asymmetry be-
tween an accused infringer and a patent owner is more pronounced when the patent
owner is a patent assertion entity. In terms of the analysis required to be performed,
accused infringers must, for example, scour the earth for prior art to the claimed in-
vention and prepare invalidity contentions related to each piece of prior art to meet
their burden to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, while patent
owners by comparison need only review technical documentation collected by ac-
cused infringers, depose the responsible engineers and scientists, and prepare one
set of infringement contentions for each accused product or service to meet their
burden to prove infringement by a preponderance of the evidence. While this cost
asymmetry is an aspect of patent litigation that can be exploited by patent owners,
including patent assertion entities, it is not necessarily an inherent problem.
* Some relate information asymmetry to problems with notice. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 7, at
393-94 ("For most other inventions, especially software and business methods, notice failure
means that innovative firms are targeted in patent infringement suits through no fault of their
own."). But in patent law, notice typically refers to notice of existing infringement. See, e.g.,
Funai Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 616 F.3d 1357, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (analyzing whether
a letter provided notice of infringement). As a result, as it is commonly understood in patent law,
notice relates only to what I call cx post information asymmetry.
See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4, at 2163 (noting that patent infringement suits brought on a
contingency fee basis often result in lower litigation faults for the patent holder than the accused
infringer); see also Schwartz, supra note 37, at 343-44 (describing contingent lawyers as "venture
capitalist[s]" who improve access to the legal system by lowering th6 cost of infringement litiga-
tion).
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3. Risk Asymmetry
Risk asymmetry is another aspect of patent litigation that, like cost asymmetry,
can be exploited by patent owners but is not necessarily an inherent problem. Pa-
tent litigation is, of course, risky. Consider, first, patent owners' risk. Patent own-
ers risk a judgment that the asserted patents are invalid, not infringed, or unenforce-
able-judgments that affect the patent owners' ability to obtain cash in the future.
Even if the patent owner has already licensed the asserted patents and therefore has
an income stream, such a judgment typically does not require a patent owner to re-
imburse its licensees for past payments. Such a judgment would merely prevent the
patent owner from obtaining future royalty payments from these licensees, plus past
damages and future royalty payments from the accused infringer. Furthermore,
even if the patent owner practices its patented technology, this judgment would
merely increase competition and decrease its profitability in the future. In other
words, the patent owner in these situations does not have to pay a dime out of pock-
et, absent the extreme case where a judge finds the case exceptional or frivolous.
Now consider the risk borne by accused infringers. Accused infringers risk a judg-
ment that the asserted patents are not invalid, infringed, and enforceable. These
judgments may lead to orders to pay the patent owner lost profits or reasonable roy-
alties and to discontinue profitable sales or uses of products and services. In other
words, the accused infringer is risking a judgment that will cause it to pay money
out of pocket and lose profit in the future. In short, the risk of a short-term cash
emergency is much more significant for accused infringers rather than patent own-
ers. And this risk is particularly acute when the accused infringer is an individual or
small business.70 As with cost, the difference in risk between patent owners and ac-
cused infringers is more significant if the patent owners are non-practicing entities,
such as patent assertion entities, as compared to practicing entities. As already
mentioned, patent owners that are practicing entities face the added risk of increased
competition and decreased profitability in the future; patent assertion entities do not
bear any such risk. Likewise, patent owners that are practicing entities also face the
risk of counterclaims of patent infringement; non-practicing entities by definition do
not face such risk because they do not make products or provide services.
III. Legislative Responses to the Patent System's Problems
Congress as well as state legislatures have considered and enacted legislation
in the last few years targeting the patent system and patent assertion entities' exploi-
tation of problems with it. In this Part, I survey this recent patent reform legislation,
considering the extent to which it addresses the three primary problems that I have
identified that some patent assertion entities exploit.
1o See Chien, supra note 7, at 473 (explaining the "strained settlement dynamic" that startups experi-
ence, which has caused at least one startup to give equity in its company to settle a claim brought
by a patent assertion entity).
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A. The America Invents Act
The first piece of legislation worthy of consideration is one that Congress en-
acted in 2011, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA). 7' As I will show, vari-
ous aspects of the AIA addressed poor patent quality, at least indirectly some of the
problems associated with patent litigation, and the asymmetries related to cost and
risk. The AIA did not, however, in any significant degree address the information
asymmetry in the patent system, and it only in a few respects directly addressed the
problems with patent litigation.
1. Patent Quality
The most extensive revisions to the patent statute made by the AlA arguably
relate to the shift from a first-to-invent paradigm to a first-inventor-to-file para-
digm.72 These revisions, however, did little to improve patent quality. Rather, they
attempted to bring U.S. patent law more in line with foreign patent systems by fo-
cusing entitlement to a patent more closely on identifying the first to file a patent
application rather than the first to invent, even though the retention of a one-year
grace period ensures that U.S. patent law is still unique compared to these foreign
patent systems.7 Likewise, other revisions are probably neutral regarding patent
quality.
Other provisions of the AIA, however, hold great potential to improve patent
quality. The most significant of the provisions affecting patent quality relate to the
revision of old procedures and the creation of new procedures governing the review
of issued patents. In particular, the transitional program for business method pa-
tents," inter partes review, 6 and post-grant review all seek to ensure that the pa-
tents the PTO issues comply with existing standards of patentability. These pro-
ceedings provide opportunities for the Patent and Trademark Office, and in
particular its newly-named and expanded Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), 5
to reconsider the patentability of issued patents, and the PTO has seized these op-
n See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
72 Id. §§ 2,3.
n Id. § 3 (grace period codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2013)); Peter Lee, Patents and the Univer-
sity, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 69 (2013) ("The retention of a one-year grace period is rather unique to the
United States; many other jurisdictions have an 'absolute novelty' regime in which any public dis-
closure of an invention prior to filing a patent application destroys novelty.").
11 See, e.g., America Invents Act § 18.
* See, e.g., Id. §§ 9 (venue), 17 (advice of counsel), 19 (jurisdiction and procedural matters), 25 (pri-
ority examination for important technologies),
" Id. § 18.
' Id. § 6.
n Id. § 6.
7a Id. § 7.
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portunities to invalidate most claims it has been presented." Commenting on this
development, the then-Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit called these new PTAB
panels "death squads, killing property rights." 0
Parts of the AIA also changed other procedures at the PTO, which may also
impact patent quality. Allowing third parties to submit prior art to examiners during
the original examination of a patent application, for example, may increase the abil-
ity of examiners to identify the best prior art to compare to the claims in pending
patent applications. Likewise, to the extent the AIA ensures that the PTO does not
have its funds diverted to other government initiatives (what is called fee diversion),
the PTO may use these funds to ensure quality examination of pending patent appli-
cations.82
While these aspects of the AIA hold the potential to improve patent quality,
what cannot be ignored is the fact that little, if anything, in the AIA changed sub-
stantive patent law in an effort to improve patent quality. For example, the AIA did
not tighten the non-obviousness requirement or increase any of the disclosure re-
quirements. And it is important at least to recognize that other revisions may hurt
patent quality. The elimination of the ability to allege a violation of the best mode
requirement in litigation, for example, takes the teeth out of the requirement; it
seems unlikely that the PTO will obtain information related to potential existing and
undisclosed best modes in anything other than exceptional circumstances. The PTO
will now rely mainly on practitioners complying with their ethical obligation to dis-
close this information, whereas accused infringers in litigation had the ability to ob-
tain discovery related to potential violations of the best mode requirement. Like-
wise, to the extent the new law is interpreted to eliminate the potential prior art
status of secret commercial uses by patent applicants, 84 the AlA permits the patent-
" See, e.g., Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Pares Review: An Early Look at the Numbers,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 101-02 (noting that in inter partes review proceedings decided
on the merits, 77.5 percent of instituted claims were either invalidated or disclaimed).
so Tony Dutra, Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse, Comments on Latest Patent Reform Bill,
BLOOMBERG BNA NEWS (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.bna.com/rader-regrets-cls-nl7179879684/
(reporting on Chief Judge Rader's remarks in an Oct. 25 interview with Executive Director Q.
Todd Dickinson of the American Intellectual Property Law Association at AIPLA's annual meet-
ing); see also Brian Mahoney, Software Patent Ruling A Major Judicial Failure, Rader Says,
LAW360 (Oct. 25, 2013, 6:36 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/482264.
a America Invents Act § 8.
82 Id. § 22.
1 Id § 18.
3 Id. § 15.
8 See Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 911 F. Supp. 2d 800, 805
(E.D. Wis. 2012) (acknowledging a party's argument that under the America Invents Act secret
commercial uses are no longer prior art but declining to analyze the argument as the updated statu-
tory language was not yet in effect), Mark A. Lemley, Does "Public Use" Mean the Same Thing It
Did Last Year? 2 (Stanford Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 2394153),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2394153 ("Under this interpreta-
tion of the new law, an inventor can use its process in secret for commercial purposes, potentially
forever, and still file a patent on that invention at some point in the future-"),
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ing of inventions long after their creation without encouraging public disclosure
shortly after their first commercial use, contrary to the incentive-based public dis-
closure justification for extending patent protection." Thus, in terms of patent qual-
ity, the AlA may effectively permit patents to issue on old inventions.
2. Problems with Patent Litigation
Now consider the extent to which the AIA addressed problems with patent liti-
gation. On the one hand, little of the AIA directly addressed problems with patent
litigation, and those that did arguably have little impact. The legislative fix to the
statutory provision governing the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, for example,
affects few cases, even if it did solidify the role of the Federal Circuit as the exclu-
sive intermediate appellate court in the United States to hear appeals from judg-
ments of claims of patent infringement." And even if the new statutory provision
governing joinder of accused infringers" provided certainty given a prior split of
authority regarding the proper interpretation of Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure," that new provision largely proved unnecessary and even misguided
given a subsequent interpretation of Rule 20 by the Federal Circuit." Moreover,
while the new provision forces patent owners to sue unrelated accused infringers in
separate cases and this may reduce cost for some individual defendants who no
longer find themselves embroiled in a lawsuit with numerous other defendants, it
may increase cost for some accused infringers. It has spawned motion practice re-
lated to joinder and transfer-procedural rather than substantive issues that alone
will not excuse alleged infringement.90 On the other hand, this new provision re-
stricting joinder may have succeeded in increasing the disincentive for poor quality
assertions by allowing accused infringers to each have their shot at proving the as-
serted patent is invalid and not infringed in separate trials.9' But the impact of this
provision on cost and incentives for filing questionable cases seems marginal at
1 Lemley, supra note 84, at 2 ("Far from encouraging disclosure, on this interpretation the effect of
the AIA is to encourage secrecy and delay in patenting."); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole
Inventor, 110 MICH. L. Rev. 709, 745-49 (2012) (discussing disclosure as a traditional justification
for the patent system).
* America Invents Act § 19 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) to ensure the Federal Circuit has ju-
risdiction over appeals from cases involving compulsory counterclaims of patent infringement and
abrogating Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002)).
87 See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2013).
* See David 0. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 NYU L. Rrv, 682, 678-89 (2013) (examining the split
of authority).
9 Id. at 657 n.15 (highlighting the decision in In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
where the Federal Circuit concluded that "joinder is not appropriate where different products or
processes are involved"),
90 See id. at 689 (noting that the varied interpretations of Rule 20 cause uncertain and costly motion
practice).
Cf WiAV Networks, LLC v. 3Com Corp., No. C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 WL 3895047, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) (applying prior law and emphasizing that accused infringers have "competing
interests and strategies" and so should be "entitled to present individualized assaults on questions
of non-infringement, invalidity, and claim construction")
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best. And nothing in the AIA impacts remedies in patent infringement cases. In
short, there is little in the AIA directly improving patent litigation in any substantial
way.
Yet the AIA may be understood as addressing at least some of the problems
associated with patent litigation by creating (or improving) alternatives to it. The
new review proceedings92 and the related provisions, at least to the extent they re-
sult in stays of patent litigation,93 indirectly impact both the lack of disincentives to
poor quality assertions and the excessive cost of litigation, even if they do not in-
crease certainty or impact the law governing remedies. And they may have signifi-
cant impact.
These review procedures provide disincentives to poor quality assertions for at
least three reasons. First, they do so because the PTAB applies the broadest reason-
able interpretation of the claims rather than the narrower interpretation a court
would apply.94 Second, they do so because the PTAB applies a preponderance bur-
den of proof rather than the clear and convincing burden of proof required to invali-
date claims in litigation." Third, these procedures will provide disincentives to
poor quality assertions if in practice there is an increased ability to stay infringe-
ment litigation in favor of these proceedings." As a result of these factors, these
proceedings put a finger on the scale in favor of accused infringers on the matter of
invalidity. They limit the ability of patent owners to adopt broad interpretations of
their patents for purposes of proving infringement; assertion of a poor quality patent
or a broad interpretation of a patent for purposes of an infringement analysis may
come back to bite the patent owner more often because these proceedings favor the
accused infringer as compared to litigation and these proceedings may be used in
the alternative to litigation.
These proceedings also may reduce the cost of patent litigation, in some cases
substantially. To the extent that courts do not permit these proceedings to duplicate
litigation, but instead allow these proceedings to resolve disputes regarding invalidi-
ty (a crucial question), they will reduce cost because these proceedings are cheaper
to navigate compared to infringement litigation in court. In this regard, the Federal
Circuit has ordered the Eastern District of Texas to stay litigation in favor of a cov-
ered business method review proceeding," The statute, however, does not provide
92 See America Invents Act § 6.
93 See, e.g., id. § 6 (provision regarding stay of civil action pending post-grant review codified at 35
U.S.C. § 325(a)(2)).
94 in re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("We conclude that Con-
gress implicitly adopted the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in enacting the AlA.").
g 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2013) ("in an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the petitioner
shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.").
96 See, e.g., VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F,3d 1307, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (hold-
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an accused infringer with a clear right to a stay of infringement litigation in favor of
these procedures. To the extent courts stay litigation in favor of, for example inter
partes review, savings may be substantial; reports indicate that inter partes review
costs substantially less than litigation.9 This no doubt is at least in part due to re-
duced discovery" and the accelerated timeline Congress imposed on the PTAB to
resolve these proceedings.' 00
3. Asymmetries
Of the three asymmetries that some patent assertion entities exploit-
information, cost, and risk asymmetries-the AIA impacts two, cost and risk. Con-
sidering cost, as discussed above the AIA provides review procedures available to
challenge the validity of issued patents rather than patent litigation. In these pro-
ceedings, costs to patent owners and accused infringers may be more equal given
the relative absence of discovery costs. Attorneys on a contingency basis may still
represent patent assertion entities, and accused infringers still have the increased
costs associated with locating prior art. Furthermore, there is still cost asymmetry
in patent litigation, if litigation cannot be avoided or stayed. So cost asymmetry
still exists. Considering risk, as discussed above the PTAB applies the broadest rea-
sonable interpretation of the claims rather than the interpretation a court would ap-
ply,'0' and furthermore the PTAB applies a preponderance burden of proof rather
than the clear and convincing burden of proof required to invalidate claims in litiga-
tion.102 These differences substantially increase the risk of invalidity bome by a pa-
tent owner in one of the modified or new proceedings where the patentability of is-
sued patents is reconsidered.
B. State Legislation Regarding Bad Faith Patent Licensing
As shown, the AIA impacted all three of the primary problems with the patent
system that some patent assertion entities exploit. It directly addressed poor patent
9 In 2012, the PTO estimated the average cost of patent litigation to be $2.769 million where the
damages fell between $1 million and $25 million. Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board and Judicial Review of Patent Trial and Appeal Board Decisions, 77 Fed.
Reg. 6879, 6903 (Feb. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 42, 90) (citing the AIPLA Report
of the Economic Survey 2011). In contrast, the USPTO estimated that preparing a petition for in-
ter partes review would cost just $46,000, plus a fee (now lowered) of $27,200. Id. at 6896. If in-
stituted, the inter partes trial proceeding was estimated to cost about $193,000 (60 percent of the
reported cost of other contested proceedings). Id. at 6905.
9 See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) ("[D]iscovery shall be limited to-(A) the deposition of witnesses sub-
mitting affidavits or declarations; and (B) what is otherwise necessary in the interest of jus-
tice; ... ,").
[a Id. § 316(a)(1 1) (requiring that the final determination in an inter partes review be issued within I
year of institution or within 18 months for good cause).
o In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding that for inter
partes review proceedings "Congress implicitly adopted the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard in enacting the AIA").
102 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) ("In an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the petitioner shall have
the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.").
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quality by focusing on the procedure used to analyze patentability. It did not direct-
ly address the problems with patent litigation, but nevertheless impacted some of
them, albeit in substantially. And it impacted the cost and risk asymmetries, but not
the information asymmetry in the patent system.
As it turns out, state legislation has focused on information asymmetry, at least
the ex post variety. Various states have enacted legislation in the past two years to
address bad faith patent licensing practices. As of this writing, eighteen states have
done so: Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Virginia, Vermont, and Wisconsin.0 3 These laws do not improve the quality
of patents, eliminate problems associated with patent litigation, or significantly im-
pact ex ante information asymmetry or risk asymmetry. Instead, these new laws
target the patent system's ex post information asymmetry: the failure of infor-
mation exchange and the resulting imbalance of information between original in-
ventors and later inventors and users after re-invention or use of the patented tech-
nology begins. The effort to correct ex post information asymmetry, moreover, has
the effect of reducing cost asymmetry,
Consider, as one example, Vermont's new consumer protection statute directed
to patent licensing practices.' 0" Vennont, which was the first state to enact such a
law, enacted the new law in part "to help its businesses avoid [litigation] costs by
encouraging the most efficient resolution of patent infringement claims."'05 The
legislation explains in more detail:
In order for Vermont companies to be able to respond promptly and efficiently to patent
infringement assertions against them, it is necessary that they receive specific information
regarding how their product, service, or technology may have infringed the patent at issue.
Receiving such information at an early stage will facilitate the resolution of claims and
lessen the burden of potential litigation on Vermont companies. 106
In this language, Vermont made it clear that it enacted its law to improve the
amount and quality of the information patent owners provide potential infringers
when patent owners seek to license their contracts prior to litigation.
Vermont's law seeks to provide these benefits, first, by broadly outlawing "bad
faith assertion[s] of patent infringement.""' Second, it lists factors that a "court
may consider ... as evidence that a person has made a bad faith assertion of patent
infringement."0 s These factors include whether the demand letter contains certain
information: "(A) the patent number; (B) the name and address of the patent owner
or owners and assignee or assignees, if any; and (C) factual allegations concerning
' See 2014 Patent Trolling Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 13,
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/rescarch/financial-services-and-commerce/patent-trolling-legislation.
in See generally VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-4199 (2013).
s Id. § 4195(a)(4).
106 Id. § 4195(a)(5).
107 Id. § 4197(a).
1os Id. § 4197(b).
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the specific areas in which the target's products, services, and technology infringe
the patent or are covered by the claims in the patent."A The statute makes it clear
that a court may consider the disclosure of this information as evidence that a patent
owner has not made a bad faith assertion of patent infringement."' 0  Thus, Ver-
mont's statute seeks to ensure the disclosure of information that may be useful to
resolve disputes over liability for infringement short of litigation and its expense. In
this way, the statute levels the playing field between patent owners and accused in-
fringers with respect to information that may be helpful to resolve disputes, which
holds the potential to level the playing field with respect to cost.
C. The Innovation Act
Given the AIA, the new state laws governing bad faith patent licensing, and
collectively their direct impact on (1) patent quality, (2) on some of the problems
with patent litigation, and (3) on all three asymmetries in the patent system, the
questions that come to mind are "what is left to fix?" and "what more can and
should be done?" The glaring omission of these previous attempts to reform the pa-
tent system is any direct attempt to solve the problems with patent litigation. More-
over, little in these prior efforts at reform have impacted ex ante information asym-
metry. With these omissions in mind, consider the Innovation Act.
Congress first attempted to pass the Innovation Act in its last term, and it will
do so again in its current term. While there were multiple proposals put forward
last term by different groups and members of Congress,"' the Innovation Act actu-
ally passed the House of Representatives in 2014.12 It stalled, however, in the Sen-
ate." 3 Nevertheless, the legislation is not dead. On February 5, 2015, Representa-
tive Goodlatte reintroduced the Innovation Act."' Given that when the legislation
passed the House of Representatives in the previous Congress it did so with biparti-
san support,"' there is good reason to think that it will pass the House again this
term. There are also indications that the Senate may be interested in passing it (or a
09 Id § 4197(b)(1).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197(c)(1).
" See, e.g., Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2012, H.R. 6245,
112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012),
112 H.R.3309 - Innovation Act, CONGRESS.GOv, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-
bill/3309 (follow "Passed House" hyperlink) (showing 325 votes in favor of the bill and 91 votes
not in favor of the bill).
113 Comment of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.). Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, On Patent
Legislation, LEAHY.SENATE.Gov (May 21, 2014), http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/comment-of-
senator-patrick-leahy-d-vt chairman-senate-judiciary-committee-on-patent-legislation ("Because
there is not sufficient support behind any comprehensive deal, I am taking the patent bill off the
Senate Judiciary Committee agenda.").
114 Goodlatte Introduces Patent Litigation Reform Bill, GOODLATTE.HOUSE.Gov, (Feb. 5, 2015),
http://goodlatte.house.gov/press-releases/660.
"'" H.R.3309 - Innovation Act, supra note 112.
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modified version of it) this term.' 6 Thus, it is important to consider how the Inno-
vation Act would address the three primary problems with the patent system.
1. Patent Quality
The Innovation Act"' would not directly impact patent quality other than
changes in a section of the Innovation Act described as improvements or technical
corrections to the ALA. The first change impacting patent quality would make post-
grant review more attractive to challengers. It would limit the preclusive effect of
post-grant review to future cases where the challenger attempts to argue that a claim
is invalid on any ground that the challenger actually raised during the post-grant re-
view.118 The Innovation Act would eliminate the current, broader preclusive effect
of post-grant review that prohibits a challenger from challenging validity in court on
any ground that the challenger reasonably could have raised during that review."I
Thus, this first change would modify a procedure that has impact on whether parties
would utilize post-grant review to ensure that patents comply with the requirements
of the Patent Act.
The second change impacting patent quality would actually reduce the ability
of post-grant review and inter partes review to invalidate issued patents. It would
do so by requiring the PTAB to conduct these review proceedings using the claim
construction that a court would use by "construing each claim of the patent in ac-
cordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by
one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the pa-
tent," 20 rather than using the broadest reasonable construction.' 2 This change
therefore makes it more difficult for the PTAB to conclude that a patent claim is in-
valid because the claim will be less likely to cover prior art or come as close to cov-
ering prior art, and the claim will also be less susceptible to invalidation based on
the enablement and written description requirements given its narrower breadth.
The third change affecting patent quality would be the expansion of the transi-
tional post-grant review proceeding for covered business method patents. The In-
novation Act would expand the categories of prior art that could be presented in one
of these proceedings beyond prior art that qualifies under the pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) to also encompass prior art that qualifies under the pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e), which in effect would allow patents and patent applications to qualify as
16 Dustin Volz, Casting Blame on Harry Reid, John Cornyn Charts Path Forward on Patent Reform,
NATIONAL JOURNAL (JAN. 29, 2015), http://www.nationaljoumal.con/tech/casting-blame-on-harry-
reid-john-comyn-charts-path-forward-on-patent-reform-20150129 (noting Senate Majority Whip
John Comyn's statement that Majority Leader Mitch McConnell is "anxious to give this subject
floor time once it is voted out of committee").
" A copy of the Innovation Act is available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/a2c6b5ad-af48-
483f-9e3e-d3420dda64e6/goodla-008-xml.pdf.
"* Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 9 (1st Sess. 2013).
119 d.
120 Id. § 9(b)(1).
21 See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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prior art using their filing dates rather than their later publication dates. 122 This
change would therefore expand the universe of prior art available to invalidate
claims; the ability to challenge covered business method patents on additional inva-
lidity grounds would increase the quality of the patents that survive this transitional
program.
A fourth change impacting patent quality is the codification of the non-
statutory obviousness-type double-patenting doctrine for patents subject to the first-
inventor-to-file provisions of the AIA.'m The codification of this doctrine would
ensure that multiple patents covering nearly the same technology are held by one
entity rather than multiple entities, addressing to at least some degree the concern
with disaggregation of patent rights and resulting patent thickets,[24 which may be
considered to be a problem with patent quality.
The only other provisions related to patent quality relate to studies the Innova-
tion Act would require. One would require the Comptroller General of the United
States to "conduct a study on patent examination at the Office and the technologies
available to improve examination and improve patent quality."' Another would
require the Comptroller to study "the volume and nature of litigation involving
business method patents," focusing on "examining the quality of business method
patents asserted in suits alleging patent infringement."1 2 6
2. Problems with Patent Litigation
Rather than focus on changes impacting patent quality, the Innovation Act
primarily seeks to address two of the four problems with patent litigation: the lack
of disincentives to poor quality patent assertions and the high cost of patent litiga-
tion. It does not address problems with uncertainty and remedies. As a result, none
of the recent legislation (the AIA, state laws governing patent licensing, and the In-
novation Act) addresses these problems.
First, the Innovation Act addresses the lack of appropriate disincentives to poor
quality patent assertions by effectively reversing the current approach to fee shifting
in patent litigation. Currently, 35 U.S.C. § 285 grants district courts discretion to
shift fees in exceptional cases. The Innovation Act would effectively flip this rule
on its head and require courts to award attorney's fees absent mitigating circum-
stances. The new test would require a court to shift fees "unless the court finds that
the position and conduct of the nonprevailing party or parties were reasonably justi-
fied in law and fact or that special circumstances (such as severe economic hardship
to a named inventor) make an award unjust." 27 In effect, rather than presume that
122 H.R. 3309, § 9.
123 Id.
124 Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4, at 2121.
125 H.R. 3309, § 8.
126 Id.
127 Id. § 3.
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fees should not shift to prevailing parties, courts would be required to presume that
fees should shift to prevailing parties.12' The current approach is consistent with the
American rule, which requires parties bringing lawsuits-even prevailing plain-
tiffs-to bear their own attorney's fees. The Innovation Act represents a step in the
direction of the English rule, requiring losing parties to pay the prevailing party's
attorney's fees. Moreover, the Innovation Act seeks to give teeth to fee shifting-
and thus to the disincentive to bring poor quality patent assertions-by requiring
that courts grant motions to join interested parties if a prevailing party shows that
the losing party "has no substantial interest in the subject matter at issue other than
asserting such patent claim in litigation," with some exceptions.' 9 To the extent in-
terested parties become parties to the lawsuit and subject to the risk associated with
fee shifting, including not just the monetary impact but also the reputational damage
associated with a court ordering it to pay for a poor quality assertion, these interest-
ed parties should be less inclined to support poor quality assertions.
Second, the Innovation Act seeks to reduce the cost of patent litigation in sev-
eral ways. It seeks to do so, first, by severely limiting discovery prior to resolution
of disputes over claim construction. In the words of the Innovation Act, "if the
court determines that a ruling relating to the construction of terms used in a patent
claim asserted in the complaint is required, discovery shall be limited, until such
ruling is issued, to information necessary for the court to determine the meaning of
the terms used in the patent claim." 3 o The Innovation Act goes on to identify ex-
ceptions to this basic rule, situations where timely resolution necessarily affects the
rights of the parties, situations where resolving a motion filed before a ruling on
claim construction is necessary to prevent manifest injustice, situations where a
competitor seeks a preliminary injunction, and situations where the parties agree to
waive the restriction on discovery. 1
More fundamentally, the Innovation Act would require the Judicial Conference
of the United States to develop rules and procedures to address specific issues and
to implement specific proposals identified by Congress "to address the asymmetries
in discovery burdens and costs" in patent litigation.'32 The issues and proposals re-
late to restricting the ability to obtain documentary evidence, shifting the cost of
discovery to the party seeking it, limiting discovery of electronic communications,
providing clear rules regarding the extent of discovery of electronic communica-
tions, and effectively eliminating discovery in many cases beyond "core documen-
tary evidence" given the requirements to pay not only the costs but also the attor-
ney's fees of the party producing the additional documents and to post a bond to
128 d
Id The exceptions relate to service, jurisdiction, venue, notice, and situations where the interested
party renounces its interest. Id
130 Id.
H.' R. 3309, § 3.
132 Id. § 6.
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ensure payment absent good cause to modify these requirements. 33 If the Innova-
tion Act passes and the Judicial Conference develops these rules and procedures, to
a large extent they will result in common local rules governing patent litigation. 134
That, indeed, appears to be the goal of the Innovation Act. 1 5 In addition, the Judi-
cial Conference would be required to develop case management procedures to ex-
pedite disposition of cases.13 6
Beyond these attempts to improve patent litigation by reducing poor quality as-
sertions and discovery costs, the Innovation Act, like the AIA, points in the direc-
tion of an alternative to patent litigation. In particular, the Innovation Act would
require the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to "examine the
idea of developing a pilot program for patent small claims procedures in certain ju-
dicial districts within the existing patent pilot program.""' Presumably this alterna-
tive to traditional litigation would substantially limit cost by, among other things,
limiting discovery.
3. Asymmetries
Beyond technical corrections to the AIA that would impact patent quality and
other provisions that would address two of the four significant problems with patent
litigation, the Innovation Act also addresses the asymmetries in the patent system.
a. Ex ante information asymmetry
The Innovation Act would impact ex ante information asymmetry. The Inno-
vation Act would not only require most parties asserting infringement to disclose
information regarding the assignee, interested parties, and their parent entities to the
accused infringer, but it also would require this information to be sent to the PTO.138
Moreover, the Innovation Act would require certain information to be exchanged
when the party asserting infringement is not a publicly traded entity, where that in-
formation would include the names and contact information of interested individu-
als." The PTO would be required to put this information, as well as other infor-
mation about the lawsuit, the parties, and the asserted patents, on its website.' 40 In
addition, the Innovation Act would require the PTO to study additional ways "to en-
sure greater transparency and accountability in patent transactions occurring on the
"n Id
i See La Belle, supra note 48 (arguing in favor of national patent procedural rules).
H.R. 3309, § 6 ("Not later than 6 months after the date on which the Judicial Conference has de-
veloped the rules and procedures required by this subsection, each United States district court and
the United States Court of Federal Claims shall revise the applicable local rules for such court to
implement such rules and procedures.").
36 Id
'3 Id 8.
Id. § 4. The Act, furthermore, requires that this information be updated within 90 days of the
transfer of rights in the patents, with particular penalties related to fees and enhanced damages if
the information is not kept up to date. Id.
139 Id.
'49 Id, § 7.
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secondary market."'"' The idea behind all of these changes is that the availability of
this information to the public would allow for potential users of technology to seek
to license the patented technology in advance of using it.142
b. Ex post information asymmetry
The Innovation Act addresses ex post information asymmetry in no less than
six ways. First, the Innovation Act would dramatically increase the pleading stand-
ard for most patent infringement cases. 43 Patent owners would be required to iden-
tify in their pleading, unless the information is not "reasonably" or "readily" acces-
sible,1 44 numerous things including basic information like the asserted patents, the
asserted claims, and the accused instrumentalities for each asserted claim by de-
scription, name, or model 45 The most significant departure from the current notice
pleading standard, however, is the requirement that for each accused instrumentality
the patent owner must provide a "clear and concise statement of where each element
of each claim ... is found within the accused instrumentality; and . . . with detailed
specificity, how each limitation of each claim. . . is met by the accused instrumen-
tality."I46 There are additional requirements to plead specific information related to
the acts of indirect infringement, the authority of the party alleging infringement
and the jurisdiction of the court, the principal business of the party alleging in-
fringement, a list of other complaints alleging infringement of the same asserted pa-
tents, whether any standard setting body has declared the asserted patents to be es-
sential or potentially essential to any standard, and whether any government has
imposed specific licensing requirements.' 47
14' H.R. 3309, § 8.
42 These provisions may also seek to expose the particular people involved in patent assertions to
perhaps limit their willingness to engage in poor quality assertions given reputational concerns.
Thus, these provisions may also provide a disincentive for poor quality assertions.
143 The heightened pleading standards would not apply to infringement claims brought under 35
U.S.C. § 271(b)(2). H.R. 3309, § 3.
144 The Innovation Act confusingly uses both "reasonably" and "readily." Id.
'4 Id.
146 Id
147 Id. There are at least three significant concerns with the proposal to raise pleading standards in
patent cases. First, as a preliminary matter the proposal is largely unnecessary given the power of
district courts to order parties to make mandatory disclosures early in lawsuits and the fact that var-
ious courts' local patent rules require patent owners asserting infringement to provide detailed in-
fringement contentions early in litigation. See, e.g., E.D. TEx. PATENr P. R. 3-1. To the extent the
Innovation Act indicates that other information should be disclosed, local patent rules may be
amended to require these disclosures. Second, because the proposal is a heightened pleading
standard, it might bar the gate to litigation in cases where discovery is necessary to provide the re-
quired "detailed specificity" of infringement. This depends, of course, on whether courts would al-
low patent owners some discovery prior to dismissing cases. Third, this proposal would overturn
the generally applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which favor notice pleading and apply
the same rules to all types of litigation. The burden would appear to be on Congress to justify such
blatant exceptionalism, which contradicts the basic policies undergirding the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the idea that the formulation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect a care-
ful balance and separation of powers among the three branches of the federal government, where
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Second, the Innovation Act also seeks to reduce ex post information asym-
metry by influencing how courts decide claims asserting fraud related to patent li-
censing, alleged violations of consumer protection laws, and motions seeking shift-
ing of fees based on exceptional circumstances. In particular, the Innovation Act
would indicate it is the "sense of Congress" that parties should not "send out pur-
posely evasive demand letters to end users alleging patent infringement;" that a de-
mand letter should "include basic information about the patent in question, what is
being infringed, and how it is being infringed;" and that "[a]ny actions or litigation
that stem from these types of purposely evasive demand letters to end users should
be considered a fraudulent or deceptive practice and an exceptional circumstance
when considering whether the litigation is abusive." 4 8
Third, the Innovation Act seeks to reduce ex post information asymmetry by
restricting the ability to award enhanced damages for willful infringement based on
pre-suit notification of infringement to situations where certain information is in-
cluded in the pre-suit notification. In particular, the Innovation Act would require
the pre-suit notification to identify with particularity the asserted patent, the accused
product or process, and the ultimate parent entity of the party claiming infringe-
ment, and to "explain[] with particularity, to the extent possible following a reason-
able investigation or inquiry, how the product or process infringes one or more
claims of the patent."'49
Fourth, the Innovation Act might impact ex post information asymmetry by re-
quiring most parties asserting infringement to disclose to the accused infringer the
identity of the owner of the asserted patents, any entity with a right to sublicense or
enforce the patents, any entities with financial interests in the patents or in the plain-
tiff, and the ultimate parent entity of any of the entities.50 One would think, how-
ever, that this information should already be available to accused infringers through
discovery.
Fifth, to the extent the Innovation Act codifies a version of the existing cus-
tomer-suit exception to the first-to-file rule," t it seeks to ensure that patent owners
cannot take advantage of ex post information asymmetry to railroad customers into
settlements. Customers often have less information regarding the technology at is-
sue, about the patent system, and about patent litigation in particular. Manufactur-
ers of the allegedly infringing product, by contrast, will have more of all of this in-
formation, or at least a greater financial interest and ability to obtain this
information. By ensuring that customers have the ability to stay patent litigation in
the Supreme Court and its committees participate in the formulation of the procedures governing
litigation in federal court.
148 H.R. 3309, § 3.
149 Id.
150 Id. § 4.
"5 Id. § 5.
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favor of litigation by manufacturers, the Innovation Act seeks to reduce the infor-
mation gap between patent owners and accused infringers.
Sixth, the Innovation Act would require the PTO to "develop educational re-
sources for small businesses to address concerns arising from patent infringement"
and to "provide education and awareness on abusive patent litigation practices." 1 2
These educational resources would also help increase the information accused in-
fringers have regarding the patent system and patent litigation in particular. In addi-
tion to these provisions impacting ex post information asymmetry, the Innovation
Act would require the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to
study "the prevalence of the practice of sending patent demand letters in bad faith
and the extent to which that practice may, through fraudulent or deceptive practices,
impose a negative impact on the marketplace."'
c. Cost asymmetry
The Innovation Act also seeks to reduce cost asymmetry between patent own-
ers and accused infringers by limiting discovery prior to resolution of claim con-
struction disputes. 5 4 If courts are able to resolve claim construction disputes that
have significant impact on the viability of the patent owner's assertion of liability,
then lawsuits may be dismissed or may settle prior to the significant additional sums
of money that the accused infringers would otherwise be required to spend to en-
gage in discovery. As discussed above, the Innovation Act also seeks to force the
Judicial Conference of the United States to develop rules and procedures to imple-
ment specific proposals identified by Congress "to address the asymmetries in dis-
covery burdens and costs" in patent litigation."'
d. Risk asymmetry
Lastly, in terms of the ways the Innovation Act would impact asymmetries in
the patent system, it would also impact risk asymmetry. Some of the changes-the
reduction of costs and the reduction of cost asymmetry-would have an indirect
impact on risk asymmetry. Changing the fee-shifting presumption in favor of shift-
ing fees to prevailing parties absent exceptional circumstances, for example, would
create more risk for patent owners. Other provisions more directly attack risk
asymmetry. With respect to assertions against end users and codification of the cus-
tomer-suit exception,' 6 for example, the Innovation Act seeks to ensure that patent
assertion entities cannot take advantage of the risk patent litigation imposes on end
users. The Innovation Act would better balance risk borne by the patent owner and
the accused infringer by allowing for the elimination of lawsuits against customers
in favor of litigation by manufacturers, which presumably have more of a long term
152 Id. § 7.
153 Id. § 8.
'4 H.R. 3309, § 3.
1 Id. § 6.
56 Id. § 5.
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interest in contesting the infringement claim and greater financial wherewithal to
sustain the cost of patent litigation.
IV. Alternatives to Use of Legislation to Address The Patent System's
Problems: Judicial and Agency Reform
In Part III, I first showed that the AIA and the new state laws regarding bad
faith patent licensing practices have addressed to varying degrees the three primary
problems some patent assertion entities exploit. To summarize (and overgeneral-
ize), the AlA primarily impacts patent quality, cost asymmetry, and risk asymmetry
by creating alternative lower-cost options compared to patent litigation for invalidi-
ty claims, while the new state laws primarily impact ex post information asymmetry
by requiring patent license demand letters to include certain information. I also
showed that the pending Innovation Act would primarily impact two of the four
problems with patent litigation (its lack of disincentives to poor quality assertions
and its excessive cost), as well as the information, cost, and risk asymmetries in the
patent system.
Notably, none of this legislation addresses two of the problems with patent liti-
gation: its uncertainty and problems with its remedies.' 57 Perhaps that is because
Congress recognizes that the courts are better equipped to address these problems,
because of concerns with separation of powers, or because courts are already ad-
dressing these problems. In fact, the Federal Circuit has made it all too clear that it
is concerned (some would say overly concerned) about certainty in patent law."'
Furthermore, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit both have been fairly ac-
tive in recent years tackling important concerns regarding injunctive relief15 and
damages. ISO
Relatedly, having considered these efforts at legislative reform and their im-
pact on the primary problems with the patent system that some patent assertion enti-
ties exploit-and given that Congress is considering passing the Innovation Act-
one cannot help but ask one last important question: whether legislative reform is
the best avenue to address problems with the patent system that the AIA and state
legislators did not address or that they did not address adequately? Or if instead,
judicial or agency action would be better? In this Part, I briefly address this ques-
tion.
17 In addition to failing to address these two problems related to patent litigation, the legislation has
not to any significant degree addressed ex ante information asymmetry.
15 See generally Taylor, supra note 38, at 440.
159 See generally, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (addressing
the propriety of injunctive relief given infringement by one component of a larger device); eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L-C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (rejecting a presumption of injunctive reliet)
'6 See generally, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (addressing
the proper calculation of a reasonable royalty in the context of infringement of a patent subject to a
reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing commitment to a standard setting organization);
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir, 2011) (rejecting the so-called 25%
rule of thumb).
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A. Judicial Reform
As I have described, there are serious concerns with patent assertion entities
exploiting problems with the patent system. But with the exception of the problems
with patent litigation, the AIA and state laws regarding patent licensing practices
have already addressed many of these problems. And to the extent further reform is
necessary to address problems with patent litigation, there remains a significant
question whether Congress is the right entity to seek to correct these problems.
Courts in particular have a vital role to play in correcting the problems associ-
ated with patent litigation, a problem that recently enacted legislation has not direct-
ly addressed. One of the most basic reasons this is so is the fact that courts have
more experience and expertise concerning the problems with patent litigation. But
in addition there are significant separation-of-powers concerns with the President
and Congress enacting a law that effectively governs the day-to-day control of pa-
tent litigation by trumping the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 6' Courts' experi-
ence and expertise combined with separation-of-powers concerns, at least in part,
probably explain why the Senate did not pass the Innovation Act in 2014. While
the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee blamed a lack of consensus
"among competing companies," 6 2 the Innovation Act received strong criticism
from judges, including Judge O'Malley from the Federal Circuit,' 63 and from the
Judicial Conference of the United States.1 64 Indeed, one must ask whether there is
justification for the exceptional nature of some of the reforms proposed in the Inno-
vation Act, and Exhibit A, in this sense, is the requirement that the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States develop rules and procedures to address specific issues
and to implement specific proposals identified by Congress.' Significantly, it
seems to me that no one has made the case that Congress should not defer to the ju-
[61 See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform; The Courts, Congress, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L, REV. 279, 282 (2015) ("[L]egislative reform [directed to pa-
tent litigation] is unnecessary because the courts and the Judicial Conference of the United States
are already in the process of fixing several problematic areas of patent litigation.").
1 Comment of Senator Patrick Leahy (D- Vt.), Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, On Patent
Legislation, supra note 113.
163 Ryan Davis, Troll Bills Would Usurp Courts' Power, Fed. Circ. Judge Says, LAw360.coM (Sept.
27, 2013, 4:34 PM) (indicating Judge O'Malley said she was "'stunned' that reform legislation
focused on litigation case management proposals, that many of the proposals "'go way beyond
where anyone should want Congress to tread,"' and that '"[o]nce you intrude on the inherent au-
thority of courts to actually manage each case before them, you're breaking down the division be-
tween the branches of government, and there is grave danger in doing that,").
164 H.R. REP. No. 113-279, at 116 (2013) (quoting a letter from the Chair of the Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States stating that "legislation
that mandates the contents of federal rules contravenes the longstanding Judicial Conference policy
opposing direct amendment of the federal rules by legislation instead of through the deliberative
process in the . .. Rules Enabling Act").
s65 Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 6 (1st Sess, 2013). See Gugliuzza, supra note 161, for
an example of criticism of this provision.
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diciary given its comparative institutional competence and concerns with separation
of powers.
Consider the relative absence of debate concerning the competence and propri-
ety of legislation, rather than judicial action, to correct problems with patent litiga-
tion. As one example, in the fall of 2013, numerous law professors signed a letter in
support of the Innovation Act. 66 Notably, in their letter these law professors did
not present any argument explaining why Congress, rather than courts, should take
action to correct problems with patent litigation." Likewise, they did not explain
what makes patent law so unique that the President and Congress should overturn
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in several respects and deprive district courts
of case management discretion.'68 In short, the law professors did not address why
legislation rather than judicial reform was necessary or appropriate. These issues
were not even part of the debate.
In my view, it is an important first question whether legislation rather than ju-
dicial reform is necessary or appropriate, particularly with respect to some of the
more exceptional provisions in the Innovation Act that ignore or overlook courts'
institutional competence and can be seen as impinging on the power of the judiciary
to govern its procedures. District courts, for example, may use their power to im-
plement changes to their local patent rules, The Federal Circuit too has shown that
it can adapt its application of the law in light of newly expressed concerns. Thus,
it may be possible to address at least some of the problems with patent litigation
without resorting to legislation; at a minimum there probably should be a presump-
tion that courts can handle problems with patent litigation that patent assertion enti-
ties exploit. Perhaps it was implicit in the law professors' letter that the existence of
problems in patent litigation is a direct result of the inability or unwillingness of
courts to correct these problems. But it seems to me there ought to be an open de-
bate concerning whether courts have failed to correct these problems once these
problems have become clear. Moreover, particularly in 2013, there had been little
discussion of, not only the necessity and appropriateness, but also the ability of par-
ticular reforms to correct perceived problems with patent litigation.170 And there
had been no significant investigation of the impact the legislation's specific pro-
posed reforms on the level of innovation in this country.




161 See generally J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REv. 1049, 1063-64 (2014) ("[Tlhe
most important changes to the patent system in recent years have been the result of the Federal
Circuit reacting to policy signals from the Supreme Court and Congress.").
1o An exception is the customer-suit exception, which one law review article addressed prior to the
House voting in favor of the Innovation Act. See generally Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Ex-
panding Patent Law's Customer Suit Exception, 93 B.U. L, REV. 1605 (2013) (recommending an
expansion, by courts or Congress, of the existing customer-suit exception).
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A robust debate regarding whether legislation rather than judicial reform is
necessary or appropriate to solve problems with patent litigation would include con-
sideration of some basic questions related to certain aspects of the Innovation Act:
* First, why codify the customer-suit exception to the first-to-file rule? The
exception already exists in the common law. Is it not being used by
courts? Is it not effective? Is there a split of authority creating confusion
and encouraging forum shopping? 7 '
* Second, why create a special statutory section for patent law requiring de-
tailed allegations in complaints when this approach is contrary to two of the
fundamental ideas behind the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the adoption of one common set of rules for all litigation and notice
rather than code pleading;'7 2 when the Supreme Court has already moved in
the direction of requiring more detail in complaints;'73 and when local pa-
tent rules require infringement contentions within a short time of filing a
complaint?'74
* Third, why change the law governing fee shifting when the Supreme Court
has already made significant changes that make fee shifting more likely and
defensible on appeal?' Should we not see how courts apply this new in-
terpretation of the governing statute?
* Fourth, why create a statute governing electronic discovery when there is a
new model electronic discovery order that courts have adopted (with modi-
fications) in the last few years;1 16 and when the Judicial Conference has
i The one law review article addressing the customer suit exception that had been published prior to
the House voting on the Innovation Act argues that "the current test for applying the customer suit
exception fails to consider the full range of costs of customer litigation and benefits of manufactur-
er litigation." Id. at 1635.
172 Eric K. Yanamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 357 (1990) ("The drafters of the rules intended to simplify the traditional
procedural model, making the system more accessible by making it more efficient,").
173 See generally Bell Att Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 (1957) and its "no set of facts" test, holding instead that "[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the com-
plaint's allegations are true"); see also Asheroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (creating a
"two-pronged approach" to evaluating sufficiency of the pleadings),
[74 See, e.g., E.D. TEX. PATENT P. R. 3-1 (requiring a party claiming infringement to disclose in-
fringement contentions "[n]ot later than 10 days before the Initial Case Management Conference").
' See generally Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014) (modify-
ing the standard of review applicable on appeal from a de novo standard to an abuse of discretion
standard); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (broaden-
ing the instances in which patent litigants receive attorney's fees).
176 See FEDERAL CIRCUIT ADVISORY COUNCIL, AN E-DISCOVERY MODEL ORDER, available at
http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/9008/Library/Ediscovery%2OModel%200
rder.pdf U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, MODEL ORDER REGARDING
B-DISCOVERY IN PATENT CASES (2012), available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/view document.cgi?document--22223&download-true. Note that the Federal Circuit itself
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created a new mandatory rule governing electronic discovery through the
existing process of changing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?'
There are no doubt good arguments to be made on both sides of these questions.
The point is that public debate regarding the Innovation Act should address the fun-
damental question of whether its reforms related to patent litigation are necessary in
light of what the courts can and are doing, and whether its reforms are appropriate
given separation of powers concerns."
In this regard, there seem to be unsettling parallels between the Innovation Act
and the provision of the ALA that overturned the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
regarding joinder-a provision that was not debated in any detail by Congress, was
not presented to the Judicial Conference, was not analyzed in advance by law pro-
fessors, and which, perhaps as a result of all of these circumstances, ultimately
proved unnecessary and even problematic given the Federal Circuit's subsequent
interpretation of Rule 20."'1 Indeed, having studied the AIA's creation of the new
statutory section governing joinder, absent a vigorous debate concerning the neces-
sity and appropriateness of legislative action, I am not encouraged by the President
and Congress tinkering with issues courts understand better and already have the
tools to address in meaningful ways.)6 0
later backed away from any sponsorship or endorsement of the model orders. Model Orders, U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS.FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://www.cafe.uscourts.gov/images/model-orders
,pdf (last visited April 18, 2015).
1 In May 2014, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure approved amendments that would
lessen the burden of electronic discovery. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
USCouRTs.Gov (May 29, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/Home.aspx (search "Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure"; then follow "Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure"
hyperlink). See Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice
andProcedure, USCOURTS.Gov (Sept. 1, 2014) (search "Agenda E-19 Summary of the Report of
the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure"; then follow "Agenda E-
19 (Summary) Rules Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure" hyperlink), for a summary of the proposed changes. Then, in September
2014, the Judicial Conference of the United States approved the proposed amendments. Zoe Till-
man, Federal Judiciary Approves Civil Discovery Rules Changes, LEGAL TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014,
3:46 PM), http://www.nationallawjoumal.com/legaltimes/id=1202670248478/Federal-Judiciary-
Approves-Civil-Discovery-Rules-Changes.
7n I do not address here their proposed reforms related to transparency and non-litigation issues.
179 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
18 To the extent the district courts do not have the incentive to correct some of the problems associat-
ed with patent litigation, it may be time for the President and Congress to address forum shopping
at the district court level. The President and Congress addressed forum shopping at the appellate
level in 1982 when it created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, But forum shop-
ping has now shifted to district courts, and the attempt in the America Invents Act to eliminate
joinder of accused infringers is all that Congress has done to eliminate the vast discretion provided
to patent owners to pick their forum for patent infringement case management and trials. See gen-
erally Taylor, supra note 88, And there is reason to think that the discretion afforded to district
courts regarding procedure has created perverse incentives for courts to favor plaintiff patent own-
ers. See generally Daniel Kleman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(discussing incentives for district courts to attract patent litigation and the potential effect of these
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B. Agency Reform
While the judiciary has the power and opportunity to correct the problems with
patent litigation, the other problems largely fall outside the judiciary's sphere of in-
fluence and beyond their expertise. But before Congress modifies or creates new
substantive or procedural patent law to address other problems, it should likewise
consider existing government agencies, the roles that they serve and can serve, and
their ongoing and potential initiatives. What this consideration will indicate is that
additional reforms addressing patent quality could focus on substantive patent law
doctrines and their implementation by the PTO. In particular, additional reforms
may seek to ensure the correct application of substantive patent law doctrines, but
also to correct procedural impediments to the correct application of substantive pa-
tent law doctrines, such as the limited time and information available to patent ex-
aminers to conduct a thorough review of the patentability of claims in patent appli-
cations.
In other words, the PTO quite obviously has an important role in solving the
problem of poor patent quality, and the uproar over the quality of issued patents
may represent a rejection of the theory that the PTO should merely serve as a course
filter of patent applications and reserve more complete analysis of the patentability
of applications for later inter partes procedures.' 8 But other agencies also serve vi-
tal roles. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, has already taken steps to
police enforcement activities of patent assertion entities, which holds the potential
to impact the problem of ex post information asymmetry.1 82
V. Conclusion
It is simply false to say that no legislation to date has addressed the so-called
"patent troll problem." In the AIA and in state legislation regarding bad faith li-
censing, legislatures have made significant progress passing legislation aimed at
correcting two of the three primary problems some patent assertion entities exploit:
poor patent quality and various asymmetries in the patent system. There has been
less progress on the other concern, problems with patent litigation. Legislative re-
form has had only indirect or minimal impact on the problems with patent litigation.
Given the interest Congress showed last term in addressing these remaining prob-
lems, however, reform may be on the way. But there are significant institutional
concerns, including but not limited to the separation of powers, suggesting that
Congress may not be the right entity to address the problems with patent litigation.
Moreover, given all of the recent changes made to the patent system by Congress
and the Supreme Court, it may be time to pause and analyze the actual impact of
incentives on procedural and substantive decision making); La Belle, supra note 48 (arguing in fa-
vor of national patent procedural rules given similar concerns).
i See Lemley, supra note 32, at 1497.
82 See FTC Settlement Bars Patent Assertion Entity From Using Deceptive Tactics, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.fic.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/1 I/fic-settlement
-bars-patent-assertion-entity-using-deceptive.
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these changes on the three primary problems underlying the current debate over pa-
tent assertion entities.

